Although border tensions between India and China may be calmer than during the Doklam standoff in mid-2017 and the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, China has continued expanding its military infrastructure near the Indian border in Tibet. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been steadily building facilities, logistics hubs and connectivity to strengthen its position along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
One recent development is the creation of a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) test centre in Tibet. Built at an elevation of around 4,300 metres, the high-altitude facility is expected to help the PLA and Chinese drone manufacturers test UAVs under extreme climatic and high-elevation conditions. The newly constructed airfield includes a single 720-metre runway, four hangars and administrative buildings. Located at 32.427667o N and 80.209502o E, it lies southeast of the existing Ngari PLA Logistics Centre.
The Tibetan Plateau's mountainous terrain and harsh climate pose severe challenges for military operations and logistics. Newly deployed PLA personnel often require supplemental oxygen to cope with altitude sickness. Troops need access to unfrozen water for essential use, and vehicles must be kept in insulated garages to ensure reliable engine performance. Helicopter operations, especially take-offs with payloads, are significantly constrained. Limited local food supplies force the PLA to truck in most essentials from distant areas through winding roads, mainly from Qinghai Province. Historically, PLA troops in Tibet have faced vitamin deficiencies due to the lack of fresh food.
China's efforts along the Indian border echo its actions in the South China Sea, where it built military facilities on reclaimed land, installed weapons and established de facto control over key areas by maintaining a continuous presence. Along the LAC, where the border remains disputed, China has been reinforcing its dual-use infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang, which fall under the PLA's Western Theatre Command.
The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), part of the US Air Force, released a report in September 2025 titled "Remote Basing: People's Liberation Army Logistics on the Tibetan Plateau." Author John S. Van Oudenaren noted: "Lack of transportation networks into and within Tibet has been a major limiting factor on the PLA's ability to project force to the border with India. Very poor or nonexistent transportation networks in remote areas forced the PLA to rely heavily on warehousing supplies. However, the recent expansion of road, air and rail networks, both into and around Tibet, has enhanced the PLA's ability to move towards a more efficient logistical model in the region."
Infrastructure development remains a priority for Beijing. Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Chairman Yan Jinhai stated in his January 2024 work report that "consolidating the border" and "building a solid national security barrier" were priorities for 2025. Under China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), US$30 billion was allocated for infrastructure projects in Tibet.
The Qinghai-Tibet corridor handles more than 85% of material and services supplied to Tibet. Chinese state sources report that President Xi Jinping has nearly doubled Tibet's highway network, expanding from 65,198 km in 2012 to 122,712 km in 2023.
India's Observer Research Foundation (ORF) also published a report this month analysing PLA infrastructure expansion near the Indian border since the Doklam standoff. Researcher Rajiv Lathar identified the G-314 and G-684 highways as the most significant developments over the past eight years, both leading to the Shaksgam Valley near the Siachen Glacier. Since the early 2020s, China has also built additional roads improving access to Shaksgam Valley from the north and east.
Highlighting other highway projects, Lathar noted: "Among the new roads, G-695 (Lhuntse to Mazar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR]) and G-216 (Altay in XUAR to Kyirong in the TAR), lying to the west and east, respectively, of the Western Highway, offer the PLA simultaneity of movement, reducing traffic on the busy G-219, enabling it to disperse movement of mobilizing forces and achieve higher force projection ratios in much shorter timeframes. If hostilities ensue, it will be easier for the PLA to switch forces from one sector to another; it facilitates mobile patrolling and area domination."
Satellite imagery shows China widening, upgrading and paving key routes west of G-219 and south of G-318 toward the Indian border. Lateral roads connect these routes to border towns. "The aim is to achieve a logistical edge," Lathar said, "despite the difficult terrain and treacherous weather conditions, in the event of a protracted conflict. The bridge over the Pangong Tso Lake, in particular, is a logistical bonanza, reducing time taken and distance drastically in the movement of personnel and equipment."
Approximately one-third of the 135 km-long Pangong Tso Lake lies inside India. China began constructing its first bridge on its side of the lake in August 2021. The 450-metre bridge was completed in May 2022, followed by a second 515-metre bridge in late 2024. After the latter's completion, the original bridge was dismantled.
Rail connectivity in Tibet remains limited due to the region's rugged terrain. Nonetheless, railway lines in the TAR increased from 531.5 km in 2012 to 1,118 km in 2023. By 2035, China plans to extend this to 5,000 km. Rail links connecting Ruoqiang in southeast XUAR with Hotan and Golmud provide strategic mobility, enabling PLA units from the 76th Group Army in Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia to reach Hotan quickly, and from there, areas opposite Ladakh.
Despite the Qinghai-Tibet railway boosting troop movement to Lhasa since 2006, the PLA still relies on roads to reach the LAC. This gap has prompted further expansion of air infrastructure. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China built at least 37 military or dual-use airports and heliports in Tibet and Xinjiang between 2017 and 2023. All five major airports in Tibet have been upgraded since 2017, particularly Shigatse Peace Airport, located around 150 km from the India-China border.
CASI's report recorded 624 border villages constructed from 2018 to 2022. While these settlements extend Chinese Communist Party influence into remote regions of Tibet, they also function as logistical nodes for emergencies such as civil unrest or conflict with India. Van Oudenaren wrote: "The expanding network of 'moderately prosperous border villages', some of which are located on territory also claimed by India and Bhutan, has facilitated a scale-up of PLA forces along the border. The expansion of civilian administration and enterprises across over 600 border villages has created more opportunities for military-civil fusion and may enable the PLA to better leverage local resources in border counties."
Border infrastructure has long been a source of tension, contributing to a decade-long infrastructure race between India and China. China's rapid construction now enables faster deployment of troops to the LAC, prompting India to work toward narrowing this gap.
The Tibet Military District hosts three PLA combined-arms brigades: the 52nd in Bayi, the 53rd in Minling and the 54th in Lhasa, the last of which is an armoured and mechanized brigade. Additionally, eight border defence regiments are stationed near the frontier.
The PLA undertook major logistical changes in the Tibet Military District from late 2015, following the creation of the Joint Logistic Support Force. Tibet gained enhanced logistical capabilities through restructuring and now directly oversees transportation, supply and medical units in major transport hubs linking Tibet with Golmud, Qinghai and Chengdu. The Qinghai-Tibet Logistics Depot and Sichuan-Tibet Logistics Depot were moved under the Tibet command as part of these reforms.
Van Oudenaren observed: "The more extensive array of logistical units under the Tibet Military District reflects the unique challenges of providing logistical support to bases and border outposts on the Tibetan Plateau. To solve the challenges presented by both the environment and the adversary, PLA logisticians are applying a range of emerging, existing and old technologies. For example, in areas where road transportation is impossible, PLA border guards sometimes still use pack animals to patrol or move supplies. At the same time, the PLA is increasingly using UAVs for drops of food or medical supplies in difficult-to-access posts."
He identified three trends showing the PLA's shift from a stockpiling model to a modern "just in case" logistics system: centralization of logistical support, new supply chain guidelines and more efficient supply operations.
In the CASI report, Van Oudenaren concluded that "a lack of transparency and a very limited record of kinetic operations make it difficult to assess the PLA's capacity to sustain major combat operations on China's border. The disputed border with India provides a rare opportunity to observe PLA logistics in the context of military engagements on China's borders."
In his study, Lathar similarly concluded: "China is positioning itself systematically for future border conflicts with India. Its strategic construction patterns are a crucial component of its broader military and geopolitical ambitions against India. By building dual-use infrastructure, it strengthens its ability to mobilize military assets quickly, reinforcing its dominance in the region, while posing a direct challenge to India along the LAC."
He added: "China is displaying a clear intent to redefine infrastructure as a tool of coercion. It aims to further integrate and solidify its iron grip on the TAR and the XUAR, further merging them into its social and economic fabric."
Lathar recommended that "China's actions should force India to rethink its national security posture. India needs to equally accelerate enhancing the pace of its border infrastructure development. Failing to do so will leave the region vulnerable to incremental gains by China that could add up to irreversible strategic shifts." (New Agency)